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How Will Declining Rates of Marriage 
Reshape Eligibility for Social Security? 
 
For most older people in the United States, Social Security is the 
major source of income: nine out of ten people age 65 or older 
receive benefits, which represent an average of 41 percent of 
their income. Among elderly beneficiaries, 54 percent of married 
couples and 74 percent of unmarried persons receive half or more 
of their income from Social Security, and 21 percent of married 
couples and about 43 percent of unmarried persons receive 90 
percent or more of their income from Social Security (Social 
Security Administration 2006). Largely as a result of Social 
Security, poverty rates for the elderly are at an all-time low, just 
10 percent (Engelhardt and Gruber 2004; Munnell 2004; U.S. 
Census Bureau 2005). But pockets of poverty persist: older 
unmarried persons, blacks, and Hispanics experience poverty 
rates in excess of 20 percent, and over 40 percent of all older 
single black women live in poverty (U.S. Census Bureau 2005). 
People qualify for Social Security based either on their work 
record or their marital status. Nearly all men qualify as retired 
workers who have contributed toward Social Security from their 
earnings. Most older women, on the other hand, receive 
noncontributory Social Security spouse or widow benefits on the 
basis of their marital history. Even though many of these women 
are also eligible for retired worker benefits, about two-thirds 
receive spouse or widow benefits because they are larger than the 
benefits they would receive on the basis of their own work record 
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(SSA 2006).1 For these women, marital status is more important 
than employment status in shaping old-age financial security. 
However, the trend to marry and stay married has declined over 
time in the United States, particularly among black women. This, 
we hypothesize, means that fewer women will qualify for spouse 
and widow benefits in coming decades. As a result, Social 
Security benefits will shrink among the very population that 
currently reports higher poverty rates, older single women, 
particularly black women. 
In this policy brief, we ask: Compared to earlier cohorts, what 
proportion of white, black and Hispanic women born in the 
1940s, 1950s, and 1960s will enter old age without a marriage 
that qualifies them for Social Security spouse and widow 
benefits? We find that the proportion who will reach age 62 
without a qualifying marriage, and thus be ineligible for Social 
Security spouse and widow benefits, is increasing modestly for 
whites and Hispanics but dramatically for African Americans. 
Starting in 2022, when women who were born in the 1960s begin 
to reach age 62, we predict that 82 percent of whites, 85 percent 
of Hispanics, and just 50 percent of blacks will be eligible for 
spouse and widow benefits. Most of these women will be eligible 
for retired worker benefits under Social Security, but those 
benefits are not likely to be as large as the benefits they would 
have received as spouses and widows, had they been eligible. 
We then discuss a range of policy alternatives, including the 
possibility of a minimum benefit. 
 
1. Literature from the Social Security Administration suggests that dual 
beneficiaries receive two benefits, one based on their earnings and one 
based on their marriage. This is an inaccurate description, however. In fact, 
each person receives just one benefit, whichever is larger. Dual 
beneficiaries receive the same spouse benefit they would have received if 
they had never worked. 
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Marriage Provides Access to Social Security Benefits 
Originally, Social Security provided retirement benefits only to 
workers. The 1939 amendments added spouse and widow 
benefits for women who were currently married to a covered 
worker and who did not qualify for their own retired worker’s 
benefits. 
Eligibility for retired worker benefits is currently defined by a 
minimum of 40 quarters of contributions from covered 
employment. Social Security benefits are based on indexed 
earnings, using the best 35 years of earnings between ages 22 and 
62. The Social Security benefit formula disregards the five lowest 
years of earnings, but those with more than five years out of the 
labor force will have zeros entered into their benefit formulas 
(SSA 2006). 
By contrast, spouse and widow benefits are based on marital 
status, and equal to 50 and 100 percent respectively of the 
covered worker’s benefit. Those who are married when initiating 
benefits face no length-of-marriage requirements. Those who are 
divorced, however, must have had a 10-year marriage. If 
divorced people are remarried at the time of eligibility for 
benefits, they forfeit claims based on an earlier spouse’s earnings 
histories (SSA 2006; U.S. House of Representatives 2000).  
Those who are widowed receive a widow benefit after age 60 as 
long as they were married to a worker who was fully insured at 
the time of death. If widows remarry, they forfeit claims based on 
earlier partners, unless they delay the remarriage until after age 
60. For many older women, the spouse benefit is essentially a rite 
of passage—all spouse beneficiaries who outlive their spouses 
eventually become widow beneficiaries and in the process double 
their benefits (Butrica and Iams 2003; Harrington Meyer 1996). 
Changing Marriage Trends 
At the time these benefits were created, the traditional model of a 
male breadwinner and stay-at-home wife was the norm. Roughly 
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85 percent of married women were in single earner marriages and 
there were only minor differences in marriage rates by race 
(Berkowitz 2002).  
But since the 1960s, the frequency and length of marriages has 
dropped notably. Many demographers suggest that marriage will 
remain nearly universal for whites and Hispanics, but much less 
so for blacks. For example, Goldstein and Kenney (2001) project 
that among women born between 1960 and 1964, 93 percent of 
whites, but only 64 percent of blacks, will ever marry. Moreover, 
people do not stay married as long as they used to. Divorce rates 
rose steadily through the 1960s and 1970s, and then stabilized in 
the mid 1980s (Ruggles 1997; Goldstein 1999). Since 1988, the 
average span between first marriage and first divorce has been 
less than 10 years (Schoen and Weinick 1993). In fact, the 
tendency to divorce now peaks in the fourth year of both first 
marriages and remarriages (Goldstein 1999). 
Our own examination of U.S. Census data shows a pronounced 
decline in marriage by age groups over time for both whites and 
blacks (U.S. Bureau of Census 1973 a, b; 1984 a, b; 1992; 1993; 
2000). In 1970, among women age 25-34, 86 percent of whites 
and 74 percent of blacks were married. By 2000, 62 percent of 
whites and only 31 percent of blacks were married. In 1970, 
among women age 35-44, 87 percent of whites and 76 percent of 
blacks were married. By 2000, 70 percent of whites and only 41 
percent of blacks were married. The difference by race is 
dramatic. During the 1970s, black women age 25 and up were 
between 84 to 87 percent as likely as whites to be married; by 
2000 they were just 50 to 59 percent as likely. 
Changing the Rules: Divorce and Gender Neutrality 
Over the decades, Congress has changed Social Security rules in 
ways that kept pace with socio-demographic changes. As divorce 
became more common, Congress declared that divorced women 
could receive spouse or widow benefits if they had been married 
to the retired worker for at least 20 years. In 1977, Congress 
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made another key change, dropping the length of marriage 
requirement to 10 years (SSA 2006).  
In 1950, Congress made the rules gender neutral and men became 
eligible for both spouse and widow benefits. Men rarely take 
these benefits because the benefits they receive as retired workers 
are nearly always bigger. Thus, 97 percent of spouse and widow 
beneficiaries are women (SSA 2006).  
The eligibility rules have not changed since 1977, however, 
leading to a decline in eligibility for these noncontributory 
benefits. Perhaps most importantly, the Social Security 
Administration does not acknowledge non-married relationships, 
which are on the rise. Heterosexual and homosexual cohabitators 
are not eligible for spouse or widow benefits no matter how long 
the relationships last. 
Are Women Better Off Collecting Worker’s Benefits? 
Women’s higher rates of employment and higher wages have 
increased women’s eligibility for retired worker benefits and 
raised women’s retired worker average monthly benefits. But it is 
not clear whether these increases will offset possible declines in 
access to spouse and widow benefits. The Social Security 
Administration projects that the proportion of women taking 
retired worker benefits is expected to rise between 1990 and 2020 
from one-third to nearly one-half (Glasse, Estes, and Smeeding 
1999). To the extent that this shift represents increasing retired 
worker benefit amounts, it means rising economic security for 
older women, but only if their retired worker benefits are greater 
than the benefits they would be eligible for as wives or widows. 
For many women, that is unlikely. The national average for 
women’s wages remains below 75 percent of men’s, and average 
earnings for black and Hispanic women tend to be substantially 
lower than for white women (Munnell 2004; Padavic and Reskin 
2002; Glasse, Estes, and Smeeding 1999). Moreover, women are 
about 40 percent less likely than men to receive private pensions, 
and when they do, their pensions are only about half that for men 
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(Munnell 2004). Social Security remains the main source of 
income for older women; thus fluctuations in the size of benefits 
will matter greatly (Munnell 2004; Wasow 2004; Glasse, Estes, 
and Smeeding 1999).  
Women’s Unpaid Work 
In part, persistent economic insecurity among older women is due 
to a lifelong tendency to take time away from paid work to care 
for young children or frail older relatives. The disproportionate 
provision of unpaid carework makes it so that women’s wages 
and pensions are not ever likely to catch up to men’s. The 
National Alliance for Caregiving (2004) estimates that 57 percent 
of working caregivers go in late, leave early, or take time off, 17 
percent have taken a leave of absence, 10 percent dropped from 
full to part time, and 9 percent either quit or retired early—to care 
for an adult family member or friend. 
As a result, even among women retiring in 2020, only 30 percent 
will have been employed for enough years to eliminate all of the 
zeros from their benefit formulas (Boskin and Puffert 1987; 
Shaw, Zuckerman, and Hartmann 1998). The remaining 70 
percent will continue to have at least some zeros and their 
benefits will be smaller as a result. The impact of these zero- or 
low-earnings years may become more severe as fewer women 
rely on spouse and widow benefits.  
Data and Methods 
Our aim is to see how changing marital patterns are reshaping 
eligibility in the context of unchanging eligibility rules. In 
Harrington Meyer, Wolf, and Himes (2005), we used Current 
Population Survey (CPS) data to track growing race differences 
in marriages lasting at least 10 years for women born between 
1920 and 1970, and followed up to 1995. In Harrington Meyer, 
Wolf, and Himes (2006) we used the same data to formulate 
projections for what proportion of women born between 1950 
and 1970 will reach age 62 without a marriage that qualifies them 
for Social Security spouse and widow benefits. 
Harrington Meyer, Wolf, and Himes 
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Our analysis uses pooled data on women age 15-64 from the June 
1985, 1990 and 1995 Current Population Surveys. We classified 
the women into five birth cohorts: 1920-1929, 1930-1939, 1940-
1949, 1950-1959, and 1960-1969. We coded everyone who said 
they were Hispanic as Hispanic, regardless of what they indicated 
about race. Therefore, the white and black categories are non-
Hispanic. We specified the age (if ever) at which each woman 
had been married for 10 years and would therefore be eligible for 
Social Security spouse and widow benefits. We then used 
microsimulation techniques to project what proportion of future 
cohorts would have a 10-year marriage by the time they reached 
age 62. (For details on the methodology, see Harrington Meyer, 
Wolf, and Himes 2005, 2006.) 
How Big Is the Drop in 10-Year Marriages? 
Past Trends 
Figures 1-3 are taken directly from CPS data and show the 
cumulative percentage of each cohort that had at least a 10-year 
marriage by age and by race/ethnicity. What we are charting is 
not the total number of women who are eligible for spouse and 
widow benefits in each cohort, but the moment at which they first 
become eligible on the basis of marital status. Figure 1 shows that 
among white women born in the 1920s and 1930s, 93 percent 
have a qualifying marriage by the time they reach retirement age. 
White women born in the 1940s are slower to qualify on the basis 
of marriage, and their trajectory levels off with about 85 percent 
having a qualifying marriage as they approach retirement age. 
The younger two cohorts are even slower to qualify.  
Figure 2 shows that black women have never been as likely as 
white women to meet the marital requirement for Social Security 
spouse and widow benefits, and the gap is growing. Among black 
women born in the 1920s and 1930s, 90 percent and 83 percent, 
respectively, reach old age with a qualifying marriage. Of black 
women born in the 1940s, only 72 percent have a qualifying 
marriage as they approach retirement age. Among the youngest 
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two cohorts, the proportions with a qualifying marriage are 
notably lower. 
Figure 1: Cumulative Percentage of White Women With 10-Year Marriage,
by Age and Cohort
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Figure 2: Cumulative Percentage of Black Women With 10-Year Marriage,
by Age and Cohort
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Figure 3: Cumulative Percentage of Hispanic Women With 10-Year Marriage,
by Age and Cohort
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Figure 3 shows a very different pattern for Hispanic women than 
for white and black women. Among Hispanic women born in the 
1920s, 80 percent had a qualifying marriage. Rates for those in 
the 1930s actually went up: 88 percent had a qualifying marriage. 
For subsequent cohorts, rates went down somewhat, but not as 
dramatically as for whites or blacks. Among Hispanic women 
born in the 1940s, 80 percent have a qualifying marriage as they 
approach retirement age. The pattern for the group born in the 
1950s is quite similar to that of the preceding cohorts; only the 
youngest cohort is substantially slower to report a qualifying 
marriage. 
Future Projections 
Now we turn to the proportion that will have a qualifying 
marriage at retirement for the cohorts born in the 1940s, 1950s, 
and 1960s. We focus on the impact of race differences in the 
retreat from marriage. The area above the lines shows our 
estimate of the proportion of each birth cohort that will reach old 
age without a qualifying marriage, and thus be unable to claim 
spouse or widow benefits.  
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Figure 4: Predicted Percentage of White Women With 10-Year Marriage,
by Age and Cohort
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Figure 5: Predicted Percentage of Black Women With 10-Year Marriage,
by Age and Cohort
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Figure 4 provides estimates for white women in these three 
cohorts and shows a modest decline in the eligibility for each 
successive cohort. A comparison of Figures 1 and 4 is illustrative. 
Among white women born in the 1920s and 1930s, about 94 
percent reached age 62 with a 10-year marriage. But a smaller 
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proportion of those born in the 1940s through the 1960s will 
reach old age qualified for spouse or widow benefits. Among 
those born in the 1940s, we estimate that about 88 percent will 
reach age 62 with a 10-year marriage, among those born in the 
1950s, about 85 percent, and among those born in the 1960s, 
about 82 percent. 
Figure 5 shows that the proportion of black women born in the 
1940s through the 1960s who will reach old age with a marriage 
that qualifies them for spouse and widow benefits will drop 
substantially. A comparison of Figures 2 and 5 shows just how 
sharp a drop is expected. Among those born in the 1920s, nearly 
90 percent of black women reached old age with a marriage that 
qualified them for Social Security spouse and widow benefits. 
Among those born in the 1930s, about 84 percent qualified. Yet 
among those born in the 1940s, only about 67 percent will reach 
old age with a 10-year marriage, and among those born in the 
1950s, just 58 percent will qualify. For those born in the 1960s, 
we expect only 50 percent of black women to reach old age 
having had a marriage that qualifies them for spouse or widow 
benefits. 
Figure 6: Predicted Percentage of Hispanic Women With 10-Year Marriage,
by Age and Cohort
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Figure 6 shows that while there was some decline for Hispanic 
women, the proportion who will reach old age with a marriage 
that qualifies them for spouse and widow benefits will stabilize 
for those born in the 1940s through the 1960s. Among Hispanic 
women born in the 1920s, just under 80 percent reached old age 
with a qualifying marriage, and among those born in the 1930s, it 
was nearly 87 percent. We project that among those born in the 
1940s, 1950s and 1960s, about 85 percent will qualify. White and 
Hispanic women will continue to have fairly high levels of 
eligibility for Social Security spouse and widow benefits, but 
black women will not. 
What Is the Impact of Declining Eligibility for Spouse 
and Widow Benefits? 
For the next several decades, Social Security spouse and widow 
benefits will continue to be an important source of old age 
income, particularly for white and Hispanic women. But for 
many black women, this safety net is becoming increasingly 
irrelevant. Among black women born in the 1960s, only one-half 
can expect to have had a marriage that qualifies them for spouse 
and widow benefits when they reach age 62.  
Those who do not qualify for spouse and widow benefits either 
because they never married or divorced before meeting the 10-
year requirement are most likely to be poor in old age (Butrica 
and Iams 2000, 2003). Black women may be not only the least 
likely to be able to make claims as wives or widows, but may 
also continue to have the lowest average worker benefits and 
private pensions. Thus, the safety net provided by non-
contributory benefits may become increasingly irrelevant, and 
therefore ineffective, for the group that needs it most: unmarried 
black women.  
Some might suggest that lack of access to a spouse and widow 
benefit might not be as problematic for black women because the 
gender gap in wages is smaller. Indeed, black women earn 83 
percent of what black men earn, while white women earn just 69 
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percent of what white men earn (Padavic and Reskin 2002). But 
black women currently have the lowest average working wages 
and the lowest average retired worker benefits (Padavic and 
Reskin 2002; SSA 2006). They are also less likely than white 
women to have private pension income, asset income, or their 
own homes (Butrica and Iams 2003). Thus, they are particularly 
economically vulnerable in old age. While retirement benefits for 
workers may increase somewhat for future cohorts, these benefits 
are not likely to increase enough to equal the benefits they might 
have received as widows.  
What Are the Policy Alternatives? 
Given the growing race gap in eligibility for Social Security 
spouse and widow benefits, why keep these benefits at all? Some 
policy analysts in the past have suggested that spouse and widow 
benefits serve as a form of delayed or de facto wages for unpaid 
domestic labor performed by many women throughout their lives 
(Myers 1982; Holden 1979; Flowers 1979). However, the 
eligibility rules are unrelated to the performance of domestic 
labor; they reward marital status rather than unpaid labor. 
Furthermore, women married to high earners receive a much 
larger benefit than women married to low earners, regardless of 
the quantity and difficulty of their unpaid labors (Harrington 
Meyer 1996).  
Other policy analysts have favored spouse and widow benefits on 
the basis of insurance principles (Harrington Meyer 1996; 
Burkhauser and Holden 1982). Indeed, married men’s benefits 
appear to shift to their wives after their death. But unlike some 
private pensions, spouse and widow benefits are not a private 
asset that is passed on to survivors. A widow is entitled to her 
own full benefit. Thus, for a man with several qualified wives, 
the benefit is not divided among them; rather each woman 
receives a widow benefit equal to his retired worker benefit.  
Perhaps the best justification for Social Security spouse and 
widow benefits is income adequacy. Two-thirds of older women 
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receive the benefits and for many of them it is their single most 
important source of income. But justifying the benefits on the 
grounds of adequacy raises the question, why assure income 
adequacy only for those who have met a marital requirement? 
Why not assure income adequacy for all? 
Reform of Noncontributory Benefits? 
Many proposals emphasize increasing the widow benefit or 
implementing earnings sharing (see Burkhauser and Holden 
1982; Burkhauser and Smeeding 1994). Efforts to increase the 
widow benefit usually involve giving less money to a couple 
while the husband is alive and then more to the widow once he 
has died. Earnings sharing credits each person in a marriage with 
having earned one-half of the annual household income, 
regardless of who actually earned the income. Such proposals are 
worth considering, but they are problematic precisely because 
they are aimed at increasing benefits to women with a qualifying 
marriage. What these proposals fail to take into account is the 
economic well-being of women without qualifying marriages. 
Such proposals further entrench marital status as an eligibility 
requirement, failing to take into account either the retreat from 
marriage, or the growing race gap in marital rates.  
Most current Social Security reform proposals continue to link 
benefits to marital status. What policy changes would be needed 
to make noncontributory benefits more responsive to the retreat 
from marriage? 
Benefits for Unpaid Care Work? 
Some proposals mimic the European practice of implementing 
child care or family care credits that either allow women to drop 
more zero years from their earnings history or actually insert a 
value in foregone wages into their earnings history (Burkhauser 
and Holden 1982; Glasse, Estes, and Smeeding 1999; Favreault, 
Sammartino, and Steuerle 2002; Herd 2002). The problem with 
proposals that link economic security to the provision of unpaid 
labor is that they tend to bolster economic security only for those 
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who are out of the labor force, have an alternate source of 
income, and are therefore able to stay at home. They provide 
little economic safety for the growing share of women who 
perform unpaid care and domestic work outside of marriage, 
balancing unpaid and paid work simultaneously. Recent 
proposals that give care credits regardless of earnings, however, 
are more redistributive and are worth careful consideration (Herd 
2005). 
Universal Minimum Benefits? 
Another option is to eliminate the link between marital status and 
eligibility for non-contributory benefits. Non-contributory 
benefits can be linked to other statuses that might have more 
equitable distributional effects, namely citizenship or residence. 
Thus, one alternative mechanism for distributing benefits is to 
establish a fairly high minimum benefit. Such a model removes 
the links to marital status or the performance of unpaid domestic 
labor. Even a modest minimum benefit, Davies and Favreault 
(2004) and Herd (2002) show, is fairly effective at reducing 
poverty and inequality among low-income beneficiaries. Wasow 
(2004) proposes a minimum benefit given to households that 
currently receive 75 percent or more of their income from Social 
Security and have a total income below the poverty line. But this 
sort of poverty based benefit might be too restrictive. In a 
comparison of several national pension schemes, Smeeding and 
Sandström (2005) show that countries with a high minimum 
benefit have very low rates of old age poverty. If the minimum 
were set equal to the federal old age poverty line, it would be 
nearly equivalent to the maximum spouse benefit and thereby 
eliminate the need for such a benefit. A minimum benefit 
approach would create an income floor that is independent of 
marital or employment history and reduce inequality in old age. 
Much of the recent policy debate has focused on privatizing 
Social Security by creating individual benefits. Given this 
experience, our emphasis on universalistic and generous 
minimum-benefit policies may seem especially fanciful. But, in 
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view of the likelihood that some policy changes will have to be 
enacted in the next 10 or 20 years, we should be prepared to 
consider policy innovations that contain costs while taking into 
account the retreat from marriage and redistributing resources to 
the most vulnerable among the older population. 
Harrington Meyer, Wolf, and Himes 
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